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Abstract
This paper develops a Nash-equilibrium extension of the classic SIR model of
infectious-disease epidemiology (“Nash SIR”), endogenizing people’s decisions whether
to engage in economic activity during a viral epidemic and allowing for complemen-
tarity in social-economic activity. An equilibrium epidemic is one in which Nash equi-
librium behavior during the epidemic generates the epidemic. There may be multiple
equilibrium epidemics, in which case the epidemic trajectory can be shaped through
the coordination of expectations, in addition to other sorts of interventions such as
stay-at-home orders and accelerated vaccine development. An algorithm is provided
to compute all equilibrium epidemics.
People’s choices impact how a viral epidemic unfolds. As noted in a March 2020 Lancet
commentary on measures to control the current coronavirus pandemic, “How individuals
respond to advice on how best to prevent transmission will be as important as government
actions, if not more important” (Anderson et al (2020)). Early on when pre-emptive mea-
sures could be especially effective (Dalton, Corbett, and Katelaris (2020)), people are at
little personal risk of exposure and hence may be unwilling to follow orders to “distance”
themselves from others. On the other hand, as infections mount and the health-care system
is overwhelmed, people may then voluntarily take extreme measures to limit their exposure
to the virus. Clearly, the way in which people’s incentives change during the course of an
epidemic is essential to how the epidemic itself progresses, and how widespread are its harms.
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This paper develops a Nash equilibrium extension of the classic Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered (SIR) model of viral epidemiology. “Nash SIR” augments the well-known system
of differential equations that characterizes epidemiological dynamics in the SIR model with
a system of Bellman equations characterizing the dynamics of agent welfare and a Nash-
equilibrium condition characterizing the dynamics of agent behavior. What emerges is a
model of equilibrium epidemics that, while highly stylized, sheds light on the interplay be-
tween epidemiological dynamics, economic behavior, and the health and economic harm done
during the course of a viral epidemic.
The paper’s most important modeling innovation is to account for the economic com-
plementarities of personal interaction that can be lost when agents “distance” themselves
to slow viral transmission. Such complementarities are missing from the existing literature
(discussed below), but can impact the progression of an epidemic in meaningful ways. In
particular, a positive feedback can arise in which people complying with public-health di-
rectives induces others to do so as well, and vice versa. As non-essential businesses close,
there is less that people are able to do outside the home, reducing their incentive to go out.
Similarly, as co-workers in an office (or professors in a university) stay home, there is less
reason to go to the office yourself, especially when the work involved is collaborative and can
be managed remotely.1
Developed independently, this paper’s Nash-equilibrium SIR (“Nash SIR”) model gen-
eralizes the Nash SIR model in Farboodi et al. (2020), by allowing for complementarities in
social-economic activity.
In the traditional SIR model, the trajectory of the epidemic is completely determined
by epidemiological fundamentals. Similarly, in Farboodi et al. (2020)’s Nash SIR model, the
epidemic has a unique equilibrium trajectory. By contrast, in this paper’s Nash SIR model,
there may be multiple potential trajectories for the epidemic, each of which induces agents to
behave in a way that generates that epidemic trajectory. Because of this indeterminancy, the
ultimate harm done during an epidemic, in terms of lost lives and lost livelihoods, can hinge
on what agents believe about what others believe. This paper’s model therefore highlights
the importance of coordinating mechanisms, such as effective political leadership, in shaping
expectations during an epidemic.
In addition to coordinating interventions such as a political leader’s public statements,
fundamental interventions such as public policies, public-health programs, scientific effort,
and new cultural practices impact the set of equilibrium-epidemic possibilities. Such impacts
1 The opposite is true of essential work. The more that essential workers are absent, the more valuable
the work done by those who remain. More generally, there may be congestion effects associated with social-
economic activity, increasing the benefit one gets as others reduce their activity. This paper abstracts from
congestion for ease of exposition.
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can be explored using the Nash SIR model, by computing the set of equilibrium epidemics
with and without the intervention in question. To enable such exploration, I provide an
algorithm to compute all equilibrium epidemics in any instance of the model. This algorithm
requires solving a set of problems, each of which corresponds to a different potential “final
condition” and involves solving a system of first-order differential equations that augments
the traditional SIR equations.
Relation to the literature. This paper follows the dominant tradition within economics
of modeling disease hosts as dynamically-optimizing agents with correct forward-looking be-
liefs. A few notable examples include Geoffard and Philipson (1996), Kremer (1996), Adda
(2007), Chan et al. (2016), and Greenwood et al. (2019). More recently, there has been an
outpouring of important work motivated by the SARS-CoV2 outbreak, much of it embed-
ding economic models into an SIR (or closely related) framework. Some notable exam-
ples include Alvarez et al. (2020), Bethune and Korinek (2020), Eichenbaum et al. (2020),
Garibaldi et al. (2020), Glover et al. (2020), Jones et al. (2020), Keppo et al. (2020), Krueger et al.
(2020), and Toxvaerd (2020).
There is also of course an enormous literature within epidemiology that models behavioral
response to infectious disease. However, epidemiologists have been slow to adopt economics-
style modeling, usually instead making ad hoc assumptions about behavior. For instance,
Bootsma and Ferguson (2007) assume that people’s intensity of social-contact avoidance
during the 1918 flu pandemic varied depending on how many others in their community
had recently died. An example that grapples with the dynamics of social distancing in the
current pandemic is Kissler et al. (2020).
Thanks to the recent explosion of interest in economic epidemiology among economists,
the gap between economics and infectious-disease epidemiology is closing. Farboodi et al.
(2020) provide an elegant Nash-equilibrium extension of the SIR model that augments the
usual system of differential equations that governs epidemiological dynamics with just two
additional differential equations. Toxvaerd (2020) beautifully analyzes a similar equilibrium
SIR model, establishing compelling features of the equilibrium trajectory. Because of their
analytical simplicity and tight connection to existing models and methods within epidemiol-
ogy, Farboodi et al. (2020), Toxvaerd (2020), and others in this fast-growing literature could
potentially have enormous influence on infectious-disease epidemiology, marrying the fields
and promoting further cross-fertilization of ideas.
Yet there is also a danger here. This new crop of equilibrium SIR models make an im-
plicit assumption that the benefit people get from social-economic activity does not depend
on others’ activity. Consequently, the “activity game” that people play necessarily exhibits
3
negative externalities (activity increases others’ risk of infection) and strategic substitutes
(increased risk of infection prompts others to be less active, Bulow et al. (1985)). As a pro-
fession, we have strong insights about such games, insights that can be easily and powerfully
communicated. These models could therefore be highly influential in terms of shaping pub-
lic policy. However, the insights that we get from these models could be misguided if, in
fact, the activity game exhibits positive externalities and/or strategic complements. This is
especially important because, as I discuss in the concluding remarks, the qualitative nature
of the game does indeed change during the course of the epidemic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the economic-epidemiological
model, along with preliminary analysis. Section 2 analyzes equilibrium epidemics in more
detail. Section 3 discusses some limitations of the model and directions for future research.
1 Model and Preliminary Analysis
This section presents the economic-epidemiological model, divided for clarity into three parts:
the epidemic, on how the epidemic process depends on agents’ behavior (Section 1.1); the
economy, on how the epidemic impacts economic activity, both directly by making people
sick and indirectly by changing behavior (Section 1.2); and individual and collective behavior,
on how the state of the epidemic and expectations about economic activity impact Nash-
equilibrium behavior at each point along the epidemic trajectory (Section 1.3).
1.1 The epidemic
There is a unit-mass population of hosts, referred to as “agents.” Building on the classic
Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model of viral epidemiology, each host is at each time
t ≥ 0 in one of five epidemiological states: “susceptible” (S) if as-yet-unexposed to the virus;
“carriage/contagious” (C) if asymptomatically infected; “infected/sick” (I) if symptomati-
cally infected; “recovered from carriage” (RC) if immune but never sick; and “recovered from
sickness” (RI) if immune and previously sick.
2
Epidemiological distance. At each point in time t, each agent who is not sick decides
how intensively to distance themselves from others. Distancing with intensity di ∈ [0, 1]
causes an agent to avoid fraction αdi of “meetings” with other agents, where α ∈ (0, 1] is
a parameter capturing the maximal effectiveness of distancing. Agents who are sick are
2It remains unknown whether those who recover from SARS-CoV2 infection are immune to re-infection
and, if so, for how long (Lipsitch (2020).
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assumed to be automatically isolated, as if distancing with α = 1. (The analysis extends
easily to a more general context in which sick agents also transmit the virus.)
Let Ω ≡ {S, C,RC , RI} denote the set of not-sick epidemiological states. For each ω ∈ Ω,
let dω(t) denote the average distancing intensity of those currently in state ω at time t who
choose to distance themselves. Let dt ≡ (dω(t
′) : ω ∈ Ω, 0 ≤ t′ < t) denote the collective
distancing behavior of the agent population up to time t, and let d ≡ (dω(t) : ω ∈ Ω, t ≥ 0)
be their collective distancing behavior over the entire epidemic.
Epidemiological dynamics. The following notation is used to describe the state of the
epidemic at each time t ≥ 0, depending on agents’ distancing behavior:
S(t;dt) = mass of agents who are susceptible;
C(t;dt) = mass of agents who are in carriage, i.e., asymptotically infected but not sick;
I(t;dt) = mass of agents who are sick;
RC(;dt) = mass of agents who are immune and were not previously sick; and
RI(t;dt) = mass of agents who are immune and were previously sick.
Because the population has unit mass,
∑
ω∈Ω ω(t) = 1 for all t.
Agents transition between epidemiological states as follows:
S → C: Susceptible agents become asymptomatically infected once “exposed” to
someone currently infected, at a rate that depends on agents’ behavior (details below);
C → I: Each agent with asymptomatic infection becomes sick at rate σ > 0; and
C → RC and I → RI : Each agent with infection clears their infection at rate γ > 0.
Initially at time t = 0, mass ∆ > 0 have asymptomatic infection but no one is yet sick and
no one is yet immune;3 that is, S(0) = 1 − ∆, C(0) = ∆, and I(0) = RC(0) = RI(0) = 0.
Epidemiological dynamics at times t > 0 are then uniquely determined by the following
3The model can be easily extended to allow for innate immunity, by allowing some mass of hosts to be in
states RI and RC at time t = 0. For instance, during the “second wave” of SARS-CoV2 infections expected
to arrive in Fall 2020, some hosts may retain immunity due to exposure during the first wave in Spring 2020.
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system of differential equations:
S ′(t;dt) = −β(1− αdS(t))(1− αdC(t))S(t;dt)C(t;dt) (1)
C ′(t;dt) = −S
′(t;dt)− (σ + γ)C(t;dt) (2)
I ′(t;dt) = σC(t;dt)− γI(t;dt) (3)
R′C(t;dt) = γC(t;dt) (4)
R′I(t;dt) = γI(t;dt) (5)
Let E(t;dt) ≡ (S(t;dt), C(t;dt), I(t;dt), RC(t;dt), RI(t;dt)) denote the “epidemic state” at
time t and E(d) ≡ (E(t;dt) : t ≥ 0) the “epidemic process.”
Note on notation: I use “dt notation” in equations (1-5) to emphasize how the epidemic state
at time t depends on agents’ previous distancing behavior. However, to ease exposition, I
henceforth suppress this notation, except where needed for clarity.
Equations (2-5) are standard—reflecting agents’ progression over time into carriage and
then either to infection at rate σ or to viral clearance at rate γ, and from infection to
clearance at rate γ—but equation (1) is different than in a standard SIR model.
Each susceptible agent i has a potential meeting (i.e., opportunity for transmission) with
another randomly-selected agent j at “transmission rate” β > 0. Since fraction S(t) of
the population is susceptible and fraction C(t) have unisolated infection, the flow of po-
tential meetings between susceptible and infected agents across the entire population is
βS(t)C(t). However, because susceptible and contagious agents distance themselves with
intensity dS(t) and dC(t), respectively, each such potential meeting is avoided with proba-
bility (1 − αdS(t))(1 − αdC(t)). The overall flow of newly-exposed hosts is therefore β(1 −
αdS(t))(1 − αdC(t))S(t)C(t), a functional form that appeared first in Quercioli and Smith
(2006).
End of the epidemic. For analytical convenience, I assume that the epidemic ends at time
T > 0 when a vaccine is introduced, giving all still-susceptible agents subsequent immunity.
(Infected agents remain infected, but there are no new infections after time T .) I focus on
the case when T <∞ and T is known to all agents, but the analysis can be easily extended
to a setting in which T is a random variable drawn from interval support.
Information states and distancing strategies. Agents’ distancing decisions depend on
what they know about their own epidemiological state and the overall epidemic. This paper
focuses on the simplest non-trivial case, assuming that (i) agents know when they are sick but
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otherwise observe nothing about their own epidemiological state and (ii) agents have correct
beliefs about the epidemic process. The model can be extended in several natural directions,
to include diagnostic testing (allowing agents to learn more about their own epidemiological
state) and incorrect beliefs, but such extensions are left for future work.
Agent i’s information state captures what she knows and believes, which depends only
on (i) the time t ≥ 0 and (ii) whether she is sick (state I), was previously sick (state RI), or
has not yet been sick (combined state N ≡ S ∪ C ∪RC).
An agent currently in information state ι ∈ {N, I, RI} is referred to as a “ι-agent.” Let
N(t) = S(t) + C(t) +RC(t) denote the mass of N -agents; thus, N(t) + I(t) +RI(t) = 1.
Agent i’s distancing strategy specifies her likelihood of distancing herself at each time
t in each information state. I-agents are automatically isolated, as mentioned earlier. RI-
agents know that they are immune and therefore have a dominant strategy not to distance
themselves. It remains to determine the behavior of N -agents.
Let dN(t) denote the share of N -agents who distance themselves. Because susceptible
and contagious agents are in the same not-yet-sick information state, dN(t) = dS(t) = dC(t)
and equation (1) simplifies to:
S ′(t) = −β(1− αdN(t))
2S(t)C(t) (6)
Attack rate. Each agent’s ex ante likelihood of becoming infected, referred to as the
“attack rate” of the virus, is equal to limt→∞(RC(t) + RI(t)). The attack rate is always
strictly less than one, even if a vaccine is never discovered (T =∞) and the epidemic is left
completely uncontrolled; see Brauer et al. (2012) and Katriel and Stone (2012) for details.
1.2 The economy
Each agent’s activities fall into three broad categories: isolated activities that can be per-
formed while distancing (e.g., lifting weights, collaborating online), public activities that
require entering public spaces but do not require interacting with others (e.g., going for a
walk, getting gas), and social activities that require interacting physically with others (e.g.,
meeting friends, working in an office building). An agent who distances herself with intensity
di can continue engaging in isolated activity, but forgoes fraction αdi of public and social
activity and reduces others’ opportunities to join her in social activity.
Availability for social interaction. A not-sick agent who does not distance enjoys all the
benefits of public activity, but engages in social activity only with those who are “socially
available.” Let A(t) denote agents’ availability for social interaction at time t, averaged
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across the entire population:
A(t) = (1− αdN(t))N(t) +RI(t) = 1− I(t)− αdN(t)N(t). (7)
(Recall that I-agents are completely unavailable due to sickness, while RI-agents find it
optimal not to distance themselves at all.)
Economic output. Economic activity generates benefits, a broad concept that should
be understood to include everything from income (work activity) and access to goods and
services (shopping) to psycho-social well-being (from interactions with friends). Sick agents
are assumed for simplicity to be incapacitated and hence unable to engage in any economic
activity; their economic benefit is normalized to zero. The benefit that well agents get
depends on their own and others’ distancing decisions, as well as how many people are
currently sick.
Let b(di;A) denote the flow benefit that agent i gets when well and choosing distance
di ∈ {0, 1}, given population-wide average availability 0 ≤ A ≤ 1. For concreteness, I assume
that
b(di;A) = a0 + a1(1− αdi) + a2(1− αdi)A. (8)
Discussion: meaning of the economic parameters. The parameters a0, a1, a2 > 0 capture
the importance, respectively, of isolated activities, public activities, and social activities
for agent welfare. More precisely: a0 captures the baseline level of benefits that a well
agent gets while quarantined in the home; a1 captures the extra benefits associated with
being able to leave the home, e.g., the extra pleasure and health benefit of walking outside,
the extra convenience of shopping in person rather than online; and a2 captures the extra
benefits associated with sharing the same physical space with others, e.g., eating out at a
restaurant rather than at home, hugging a friend rather than just talking on the phone. (Put
differently: a2 is the cost associated with everyone else being quarantined; a1 is the cost of
quarantining yourself, in a world where everyone else is quarantined; and a0 is the cost of
being sick, in a world where everyone is quarantined.) These parameters can be changed
in many ways. For instance, a restaurant service that delivers safely-prepared fresh-cooked
meals would increase a0 and reduce a2, as would improved virtual-meeting technology that
enhances remote collaboration.
Discussion: functional form of economic benefits. The assumption that the benefits of public
and social activity are linear in own and others’ availability simplifies the presentation but is
not essential for the analysis or qualitative findings. For instance, suppose that agents were
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to prioritize their activities, e.g., by leaving the home only to get urgently-needed supplies,
or to visit only with their dearest friends. In that case, each agent’s benefit from public and
social activity would naturally be a concave function of her own personal distance and of
others’ availability. The analysis can be easily adapted to allow for such concavity, but at
the cost of complicating the presentation.
Economic losses due to the virus. If the virus did not exist, then no one would become
sick and everyone would choose not to distance. All agents would then get constant flow
economic benefit b(0; 1) = a0 + a1 + a2 and, since the population has unit mass, overall
economic activity would also be b(0; 1). The virus reduces economic activity directly, by
making people sick, and indirectly, by inducing not-yet-sick agents to distance themselves.
Distancing in turn creates two sorts of economic harm: “private harm” that distancing
oneself reduces one’s own public and social activity, and “social harm” that distancing oneself
reduces others’ social activity.
Let bt(di) be shorthand for each well agent’s flow economic benefit at time t. bt(di)
depends on (i) how many people are recovered from sickness, RI(t), and how many are
currently sick, I(t) = 1 − N(t) − RI(t), (ii) what fraction dN(t) of not-yet-sick agents are
distancing, and (iii) her own distancing choice di ∈ {0, 1}:
bt(di) = a0 + a1(1− αdi) + a2(1− αdi)A(t)
= a0 + a1(1− αdi) + a2(1− αdi)((1− αdN(t))N(t) +RI(t))
All agents suffer economically throughout the epidemic, relative to the no-virus benchmark
case in which everyone gets flow benefit a0 + a1 + a2:
Sick: I-agents are incapacitated and get zero economic benefit. These agents lose
a0 + a1 + a2.
Previously sick: RI -agents do not distance, but have less opportunity for social in-
teraction due to others’ distancing behavior. These agents lose social-activity benefit
a2(1− A(t)).
Not-yet-sick: N -agents choose distancing intensity dN(t), reducing their public and
social activities by a factor of (1 − αdN). These agents lose public-activity benefit
a1αdN and lose social-activity benefit a2(1− (1−αdN)A(t)) = a2(1−A(t)+αdNA(t)).
Let ΓE(t) denote the lost economic activity at time t, across the entire population. Overall
economic loss across the entire epidemic is ΓE =
∫∞
0
ΓE(t)dt. (If future losses are discounted
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by discount factor 0 < δ ≤ 1, then the overall economic loss has present value ΓE =∫∞
0
δtΓE(t)dt at time 0. I focus on the case without discounting for ease of exposition.)
Lemma 1. ΓE(t) = a0I(t) + a1(1− A(t)) + a2(1− A(t)
2).
Proof. See the Appendix.
1.3 Individual welfare and equilibrium behavior
Each agent seeks to minimize her own total4 losses during the course of the entire epidemic.
Let li(t) denote agent i’s flow loss at time t. As discussed earlier: li(t) = a0 + a1 + a2 if
i is sick; li(t) = a2(1−A(t)) if i is well and not distancing, where A(t) is others’ availability
for social interaction; and li(t) = a1α + a2(1−A(t) + αA(t)) if i is well and distancing.
Let Lω(t) denote agent i’s expected future total losses starting from time t if in epi-
demiological state ω ∈ {S, C, I, RC, RI}, referred to as “continuation losses from state ω.”
(Continuation losses depend on future agent behavior and the future trajectory of the epi-
demic, but I suppress such notation as much as possible for ease of exposition.) A susceptible
agent who becomes infected at time t will not notice this transition but, at that moment,
her continuation losses change from LS(t) to LC(t). Let H(t) ≡ LC(t) − LS(t) denote the
“harm of susceptible exposure” at time t.
Let pi(t) denote agent i’s subjective belief about her own likelihood of being susceptible at
time t, conditional on being not-yet-sick. At time t, mass N(t) of agents are not-yet-sick, of
whom mass S(t) remain susceptible. Thus, N -agents’ average likelihood of being susceptible
is S(t)
N(t)
. For simplicity, I will focus on epidemics with symmetric behavior by all those in the
same information state at each point in time, in which case pi(t) =
S(t)
N(t)
.
Gain from distancing: reduced exposure. Suppose that, at time t, agent i distances
with intensity di ∈ [0, 1] and other N -agents distance themselves with intensity dN ∈ [0, 1].
Agent i is then exposed to the virus at rate β(1 − αdi)(1 − αdN)C(t), compared to being
exposed at rate β(1−αdN)C(t) if not distancing at all. The “gain from distancing” at time
t, denoted GAINt(dN), is therefore
GAINt(di, dN) = αdiβ(1− αdN)C(t)×H(t)×
S(t)
N(t)
. (9)
4The analysis can be trivially extended to allow for discounting of future losses.
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The marginal gain from distancing t(dN) =
dGAINt(di,dN )
ddi
is then
MGt(dN) = α(1− αdN)
βS(t)C(t)H(t)
N(t)
. (10)
Note that the marginal gain from distancing is decreasing in dN . This is because, as others
distance themselves more, agents face less risk of exposure.
Economic cost of distancing: reduced activity. If other N -agents choose distancing
intensity dN , agent i gets flow economic benefit a0+a1(1−αdi)+a2(1−αdi)((1−αdN)N(t)+
RI(t)) when choosing distancing intensity di, compared to a0+a1+a2((1−αdN )N(t)+RI(t))
when not distancing at all. The “cost of distancing” at time t, denoted COSTt(di, dN), is
therefore
COSTt(di, dN) = a1αdi + a2αdi((1− αdN)N(t) +RI(t)). (11)
The marginal cost of distancing MCt(dN) =
dCOSTt(di,dN )
ddi
is then
MCt(dN) = a1α + a2α((1− αdN)N(t) +RI(t)). (12)
Note that the marginal cost of distancing is decreasing in dN . This is because, as others
distance themselves more, there are fewer opportunities for social activity.
Because the marginal gain and the marginal cost of distancing are each decreasing in dN ,
the game that N -agents play may exhibit “strategic substitutes” or “strategic complements”
(Bulow et al. (1985)), depending on the epidemic state. By contrast, in Quercioli and Smith
(2006), there are no sources of strategic complementarity.
“Distancing game” among agents. At each time t, the not-yet-sick N -agents play a
game when deciding whether or not to distance. (Sick I-agents are incapacitated, while
previously sick RI-agents obviously prefer not to distance. Thus, only N -agents have a non-
trivial decision.) I assume that N -agents play a Nash equilibrium (NE) of this game, and
focus on symmetric NE in which all N -agents choose the same distancing intensity.
Proposition 1. Given epidemic state E(t) = (S(t), C(t), I(t), RC(t), RI(t)) and harm from
susceptible exposure H(t) = LC(t)− LS(t), the “time-t distancing game” played by not-yet-
sick agents has a unique symmetric NE, in which agents choose distancing intensity d∗N(t).
In particular: (i) if MGt(0) ≤ MCt(0), then d
∗
N(t) = 0; (ii) if MGt(1) ≥ MCt(1), then
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d∗N(t) = 1; and (iii) otherwise, if MGt(0) > MCt(0) and MGt(1) < MCt(1) then
d∗N(t) =
βS(t)C(t)H(t)
N(t)
− a1 − a2(N(t) +RI(t))
α
(
βS(t)C(t)H(t)
N(t)
− a2N(t)
) ∈ (0, 1). (13)
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
Uniqueness of symmetric NE is not obvious, since the time-t distancing game may have
either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, depending on the epidemic state and
the harm of susceptible exposure. However, uniqueness arises because N -agents have a
dominant strategy whenever the game has strategic complements.
Equilibrium epidemics. Let E(dN) denote the epidemic process that results when N -
agents choose distancing intensity dN(t) at each time t, as determined by the system (2-6).
E∗ is referred to as an equilibrium epidemic process (or “behaviorally-constrained epidemic”)
if (i) E∗ = E(d∗N) and (ii) given the epidemic process E
∗, the time-t distancing game has a
symmetric NE in which N -agents choose distancing intensity d∗N(t), for all t ≥ 0.
2 Equilibrium Epidemic Analysis
This section characterizes all equilibrium epidemics with symmetric5 agent behavior (or,
more simply, “equilibrium epidemics”) and provides an algorithm for computing them. The
analysis is organized as follows. First, the augmented system of differential equations that
governs economic-epidemiological dynamics in the Nash SIR model is presented. This sys-
tem builds on the well-known system that governs epidemiological dynamics in the SIR
model. Second, for any given “final prevalences” (S(T ), C(T ), I(T ), RI(T )) at time T when
distancing ends (due to a perfect vaccine being introduced), there is at most one equilibrium
epidemic having these final prevalences.
2.1 Economic-epidemiological dynamics
At any given time t, the epidemic is characterized by: (i) the mass of agents in each epidemi-
ological state (S(t), C(t), I(t), RC(t), RI(t)); (ii) the welfare of agents in each epidemiologi-
cal state (as captured by state-contingent “continuation losses” LS(t), LC(t), LI(t), LRC (t),
LRI (t)); and (iii) the distancing behavior of agents who are not yet sick (d
∗
N(t)).
5I do not know if an equilibrium epidemic can exist with asymmetric behavior by symmetric agents.
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Epidemiological dynamics. The dynamics of the epidemic state E(t) = (S(t), C(t), I(t),
RC(t), RI(t)) up until time T are determined by equations (2-6) and depend on N -agents’
distancing behavior. After the vaccine is introduced at time T , equations (2-5) remain
unchanged but, because there is no further transmission of the virus, S ′(t) = 0.
Distancing behavior. Lemma 1 characterizes N -agents distancing behavior dN(t) at each
time t, depending on the epidemic state E(t) and the harm of susceptible exposure H(t) =
LC(t)− LS(t).
Welfare dynamics. It remains to characterize how the continuation losses associated with
each epidemiological state change over time.
State RI . Agents who have recovered from sickness remain well
6 and choose not to distance.
Such an agent still suffers from the fact that others are distancing, losing social-activity
benefit a2(αd
∗
N(t)N(t) + I(t)) relative to the no-virus benchmark in which everyone earns
flow benefit a0 + a1 + a2. Because these losses are “sunk” once experienced, and because
RI-agents do not transition to any other state,
L′RI (t) = −a2(αd
∗
N(t)N(t) + I(t)). (14)
After time T when new transmission stops, all social distancing stops, i.e., d∗N(t) = 0 for all
t > T . However, well agents still suffer from not being able to engage socially with those
who are sick. In particular, LRI (t) =
∫
t′≥t
a2I(t
′)dt′ for all t ≥ T .
State I. Sick agents incur flow loss a0 + a1 + a2 and transition to the recovered state RI at
rate γ. Thus,
L′I(t) = −(a0 + a1 + a2) + γ(LI(t)− LRI (t)). (15)
State RC. Agents who have recovered from carriage never learn that they are immune, and so
continue to distance themselves throughout the entire epidemic. In particular, these agents
lose public-activity benefit a1αd
∗
N(t), lose social-activity benefit a2(1 − (1 − αd
∗
N(t))((1 −
αd∗N(t))N(t) +RI(t)), and never transition to another state. Thus,
L′RC (t) = −a1α− a2(1− (1− αd
∗
N(t))((1− αd
∗
N(t))N(t) +RI(t)). (16)
After time T , because all social distancing stops and RC-agents do not become sick, their
6The analysis can be extended in a straightforward way to allow for the possibility of re-infection, for
instance, by having recovered agents transition back at some rate to the susceptible state.
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only subsequent losses come from not being able to interact with other people who are sick,
the same as RI-agents. So, LRC (t) = LRI (t) for all t ≥ T .
State C. Agents with asymptomatic infection incur the same flow losses due to social dis-
tancing as all not-yet-sick agents (including those in state RC), but transition to sickness at
rate σ and to asymptomatic recovery at rate σ. Thus,
L′C(t) = L
′
RC
(t) + γ(LI(t)− LC(t)) + σ(LRC (t)− LC(t)). (17)
State S. Susceptible agents incur the same flow losses as all other not-yet-sick agents, but
become asymptomatically infected at rate β(1− αd∗N(t))
2S(t)C(t). Thus,
L′S(t) = L
′
RC
(t) + β(1− αd∗N(t))
2S(t)C(t)(LC(t)− LS(t)). (18)
After time T , S-agents remain susceptible and only suffer from not being able to interact
with others who are sick, the same as RI -agents. So, LS(t) = LRI (t) for all t ≥ T .
2.2 Algorithm
Suppose for a moment that an equilibrium exists with final epidemic state E(T ). Here
I discuss how to determine numerically whether an equilibrium epidemic exists with this
“final condition” and, if so, to compute the entire epidemic trajectory.
Observe first that the final epidemic state uniquely pins down the trajectory of the epi-
demic after time T . Because there is no new transmission, no one distances and subsequent
epidemiological dynamics are trivial: contagious agents leave state C at rate γ + σ, fraction
σ
γ+σ
becoming sick; sick agents recover at rate γ; and others remain in their current state.
Moreover, because C(T ) and I(T ) together determine (I(t) : t ≥ T ), they also determine
LRI (t) = LRC (t) = LS(t) =
∫
t′≥t
a2I(t
′)dt′ for all t ≥ T , which in turn determine LC(t) and
LI(t) after T .
Having determined LS(T ) and LC(T ), we now know H(T ) = LC(T )−LS(T ), the harm of
susceptible exposure just before the vaccine is introduced. Together with the final epidemic
state, this uniquely determines N -agents’ equilibrium distancing intensity just before the
vaccine is introduced, as characterized in Proposition 1.
Having determined N -agent behavior d∗N(t), we now can determine: S
′(T ) (equation (6))
and all other epidemiological dynamics, which remain unchanged (equations (2-5)); L′RI (T ),
which in turn determines L′I(T ) (equations (14,15)); and L
′
RC
(T ), which together with L′I(T )
determines L′C(T ), which in turn determines L
′
S(t) (equations (16,17,18)). In this way, any
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candidate epidemic can be uniquely traced backward over time, from the given final epidemic
state (“final condition”), until one of three things happens: (i) the trajectory hits an invalid
boundary7, in which case no equilibrium epidemic exists with the given final condition; (ii)
the backwards trajectory “ends” at the desired initial epidemic state E(0) = (1−∆,∆, 0, 0, 0),
in which case a unique equilibrium epidemic exists with the given final condition; or (iii) the
backwards trajectory ends at some other initial epidemic state E(0) 6= (1−∆,∆, 0, 0, 0), in
which case no equilibrium epidemic exists with the given final condition.
3 Concluding Remarks
This paper introduces Nash SIR, an economic-epidemiological model of a viral epidemic
that builds on the classic Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model of infectious-disease
epidemiology. The model departs from the previous literature by focusing on the complemen-
tarities associated with the social-economic activity that can be lost when agents distance
themselves to prevent the spread of infection.
A changing game. An important complicating feature of this paper’s model is that, as
the epidemic progresses through its course, the basic strategic structure of the “distancing
game” that agents play changes over time. For instance, very early in the epidemic when
infection remains rare, the distancing game exhibits negative externalities, since agents get
little health benefit but suffer substantial economic harm when others distance themselves.
However, that changes once infection grows more common, as others’ distancing generates
greater health benefit. Moreover, the game can shift between having strategic substitutes
and strategic complements.
Complementarity and multi-dimensionality of agent actions. This paper focuses on
a simple context in which the only way to protect oneself from infection is to avoid public and
in-person social activity. However, people can also prevent transmission in other ways, such
as wearing a mask. Bearing that in mind, it would be interesting to generalize the analysis
to allow agents to decide both (i) how much to curtail their public and social activities
(“avoidance,” as in this paper), and (ii) how much to change their behavior during such
activities (“vigilance,” as in Quercioli and Smith (2006)). The game that agents play in this
richer context has an interesting strategic structure, with agents’ vigilance decisions always
being strategic substitutes, agents’ avoidance decisions potentially being either strategic
7An “invalid boundary” is reached if S(t), C(t), I(t), RC(t), or RI(t) equals zero at any time t > 0.
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complements or strategic substitutes, more vigilance promoting less avoidance, and more
avoidance promoting less vigilance.
Asymmetry and social inequality. This paper assumes that agents are symmetric for
ease of exposition, but this assumption appears to entail meaningful loss of generality. In
particular, assuming that all agents are the same at the start of the epidemic obscures
important issues related to inequality and social justice. To see why, suppose that agents
belong to one of two social classes: “elites” who are able to earn income and care for
themselves from home (higher a0) and “non-elites” whose income and well-being hinge more
on being in public social spaces (higher a2). With less to lose by staying at home, elites will
distance themselves relatively early during the epidemic. Having distanced less in the past,
non-elites will then be more likely than elites to already have been exposed to the virus—
further reducing their relative incentive to distance. In the end, the equilibrium trajectory
of the epidemic could exacerbate pre-existing inequality, with non-elites bearing the brunt
of the burden of the epidemic, being more likely to become sick and suffering more from the
economic contraction associated with elite-driven distancing.
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A Mathematical proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Recall that A(t) = (1−αdN(t))N(t)+RI(t) and hence 1−A(t) = I(t)+αdN(t)N(t).
Isolated activity: Sick agents get no benefit, while well agents get full benefit a0. The overall
economic loss due to reduced isolated activity at time t is therefore a0I(t).
Public activity: Sick agents get no benefit, well agents who do not distance get full benefit
a1, and well agents who distance get benefit a1(1 − α). Since fraction dN(t) of N -agents
distance and no RI-agents distance, the overall economic loss due to reduced public activity
at time t is therefore a1(I(t) + αdN(t)N(t)) = a1(1− A(t)).
Social activity: Sick agents get no benefit, well agents who do not distance get benefit a2A(t),
and well agents who distance get benefit a2(1−α)A(t) (and hence lose a2(1−A(t)+αA(t))).
The overall economic loss due to reduced social activity at time t is therefore a2 times
I(t) + (1− A(t))(RI(t) + (1− dN(t))N(t)) + (1− A(t) + αA(t))dN(t)N(t)
= I(t) + (1− A(t))(RI(t) + (1− dN(t))N(t)) + ((1− A(t))(1− α) + α)dN(t)N(t)
= 1− A(t) + (1− A(t)) (RI(t) + (1− dN(t))N(t) + (1− α)dN(t)N(t))
= (1− A(t))× (1 +RI(t) + (1− αdN(t))N(t))
= (1− A(t))× (1 + A(t)) = 1− A(t)2
as desired.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. (i) No distancing: If MGt(0) ≤ MCt(0), then the time-t distancing game has a
symmetric NE in which all agents choose not to distance, i.e., d∗N(t) = 0. To establish
uniqueness, note by equations (10-12) that MGt(0) ≤ MCt(0) implies
βS(t)C(t)H(t)
N(t)
≤ a1 +
a2(N(t) +RI(t)). But then
MGt(1) = α(1− α)
βS(t)C(t)H(t)
N(t)
≤ α(1− α)(a1 + a2(N(t) +RI(t)))
< α(a1 + a2((1− α)N(t) +RI(t)))
= MCt(1)
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Since MGt(dN) and MCt(dN) are each linear in dN , the fact that MGt(0) ≤ MCt(0) and
MGt(1) < MCt(1) implies that MGt(dN) < MCt(dN) for all dN ∈ (0, 1]. In particular,
N -agents have a dominant strategy not to distance.
(ii) Maximal distancing: If MGt(1) ≥ MCt(1), then a symmetric NE exists in which
all agents choose to distance as much as possible, i.e., d∗N(t) = 1. To establish uniqueness,
note by equations (10-12) that MGt(1) ≥MCt(1) implies (1−α)
βS(t)C(t)H(t)
N(t)
≥ a1+ a2((1−
α)N(t) +RI(t)). But then
MGt(0) = α
βS(t)C(t)H(t)
N(t)
≥
α
1− α
(a1 + a2((1− α)N(t) + RI(t)))
> α(a1 + a2(N(t) +RI(t)))
= MCt(0)
Since MGt(dN) and MCt(dN) are each linear in dN , the fact that MGt(1) ≥ MCt(1) and
MGt(0) > MCt(0) implies that MGt(dN) > MCt(dN) for all dN ∈ [0, 1). In particular,
N -agents have a dominant strategy to distance.
(iii) Intermediate distancing: If MGt(0) > MCt(0) and MGt(1) < MCt(1), then it
must be that MG′t(dN) = −
α2βS(t)C(t)H(t)
N(t)
< −α2a2N(t) = MC
′
t(dN) and hence that there
exists a unique d∗N(t) ∈ (0, 1) such that MGt(d
∗
N(t)) = MCt(d
∗
N(t)), MGt(dN) > MCt(dN)
for all dN < d
∗
N(t), and MGt(dN) < MCt(dN) for all dN > d
∗
N(t). In particular, solving
MGt(d
∗
N(t)) =MCt(d
∗
N(t)) yields
d∗N(t) =
βS(t)C(t)H(t)
N(t)
− a1 − a2(N(t) +RI(t))
α
(
βS(t)C(t)H(t)
N(t)
− a2N(t)
) . (19)
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